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ALBERT JOHN and ANGELA
BUTTERFIELD, as guardian and
parents of and on behalf of
TIFFANY RUTH BUTTERFIELD,
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did Plaintiff establish the requisite causal

link between

the treatment rendered by Defendants' to the death of the minor
child?
Was

proximate

causation

called

into question

by

the

defendants in moving for summary judgment sufficiently to require
Plaintiffs to come forward with evidence of a causal link between
the purported malpractice and harm for which Plaintiffs

sought

damages?
Did the Court improperly

rule on lack of proximate cause

when the lower court ruled on the issue of proximate causation
only

from the perspective

that intervening

events

occurred

superceding any misconduct on the part of the defendants?
Reference to Opinion Below
Butterfield v. Okubo, 880347CA, filed March 28, 1990.
I

Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is invoked pursuant to
Utah Code Annot. 78-2-2(5) requesting review of a Utah Court of
Appeals decision filed on March 28, 1990

This court has granted

an extension of time on April 27, 1990 for Petitioners to file a
petition by May 27, 1990.
Controlling Provisions
Jackson v. Hicks, 738 P.2d

1037

(Utah 1987), Mitchell v.

Pearson Enters., Inc., 697 P.2d

240

(Utah 1985), Williams v.

Melby,

699

P.2d

723

(Utah

1985), Restatements

2d of

Torts

sections 431-452, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 8, and
Powell

Div.

of Dow Chemical

U. S. A. v. Del-Rio

Drilling

Programs, Inc., 761 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1988).
Statement of the Case
Petitioners

filed

a wrongful

death complaint

against

respondents Dr. Nickol, Dr. Okubo, and Holy Cross Jordan Valley
Hospital alleging improper and negligent treatment by respondents
resulted in their infant child's death.
The respondents moved for summary judgment at the District
Court level and were granted summary judgment by an order dated
January 27, 1988.

See addendum "A."

Petitioners appealed the

order granting summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court judgment.

See addendum "B."

Petitioners presented an affidavit of Dr. Jacobs to defeat
their summary judgment motions.

See addendum "C."

Arguments
POINT I
2

PROXIMATE CAUSE WAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED BY PETITIONER
The Court of Appeals found that Petitioner did not establish
the requisite causal link between the Respondent's treatment and
the infant child's death.
However

a close

look

at

See addendum "A" at pages 6 and 7.
the

supporting

affidavit

indicates that the issue of proximate cause was

clearly

sufficiently

presented by Dr. Jacobs to indicate that Respondents failure to
follow the standard of care resulted in the death of the parties
minor child.

"The above, in my opinion, constitutes care below

an accepted standard

(negligence) and was the proximate cause of

the child's demise from SIDS."

Addendum C at 13.

Dr. Jacobs had

previous set forth how the hospital had failed to properly make
records available to detail previous hospital visits and how the
two respondent physicians should have required the deceased

to

have been observed in the hospital and required the use of a home
apnea monitor.
the

Therefore the proper legal cause of the demise of

infant was presented when

looked at in the

light most

favorable to Petitioner.
POINT II
THE COURT IMPROPERLY SHIFTED THE BURDEN TO PETITIONER TO SHOW
A LACK OF INTERVENING FACTORS
The court in granting summary judgment for respondents ruled
that the respondents were not a proximate cause of the infant
plaintiff's death inasmuch as there were intervening events tat
superceded any misconduct on the part of the said defendants.
Addendum

A at page 2.

The motions for summary judgment do not

specify any factual elements of any intervening events and there
3

is nothing in the record to give Plaintiffs cause to rebut any
assertion of superceding causes.

Therefore, to have required and

ruled on intervening acts occurring without bringing allowing
rebuttal impermissibly shifted the burden of proof and denied
Plaintiff due process.
Dated this 26th day of May, 1990.

David Grinasl
Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing petitioner writ of certiorari were mailed
prepaid this

*i

day of -May, r930 to:

R. Scott Williams
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent Okubo
David W. Slagle
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Holy Cross
Gary D. Stott
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main Street, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Respondent Nickol
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By
R. Scott Williams, #3498
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant Okubo
Sixth Floor Boston Building
19 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA
BUTTERFIELD# as guardians
and parents of and on
behalf of TIFFANY RUTH
BUTTERFIELD,

ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENTS

Plaintiffs,
-vsDAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICKOL,
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5,

Civil No«

C86-925Q

Judge Richard Moffat

Defendants.
•oooOoooThe defendants David Okubo, Thomas Nickol, and Holy
Cross Jordan Valley Hospital's Motion! for fummary judgment
having come up for hearing on December 23, 1987# and the
court having heard additional arguments on January 5# 19889
and the court having reviewed the memoranda and affidavits
in this matter, and the court having found as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs have not established through comp«t«nt
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo

PILED
MAR £81990

Albert John Butterfield and
Angela Butterfield, on behalf
of Tiffany Ruth Butterfield,

r
r*nr
* of *i«.Court

OPINION
(For Publication)
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No. 880347-CA

v.
David Okubo, Thomas Nickol,
and Holy Cross Jordan Valley
Hospital,
Defendant and Respondents,

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat
Attorneys: David L. Grindstaff, Salt Lake City, for the
Butterfields
R. Scott Williams, Salt Lake City, for Okubo
Gary D. Stott, Salt Lake City, for Nickol
David W. Slagle, Salt Lake City, for Holy Cross Jordan
Valley Hospital

Before Judges Davidson, Jackson, and Larson.1
LARSON, Judge:
Albert and Angela Butterfield appeal from a summary judgment
dismissing this action for wrongful death, which they allege to
be due to medical malpractice by the defendants. Because of a
lack of evidence in the record concerning proximate cause, we
affirm.
1. John Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Judge, sitting by special
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989).

The Butterfields' infant daughter Tiffany died at home on
December 20, 1984 of sudden infant death syndrome. She was
born June 30, 1984. On that day and again on July 16, 1984,
Tiffany was examined by Dr. David Okubo, a pediatrician. On
two occasions in July and August 1984, the Butterfields noted
apparent problems in Tiffany's breathing and took her to the
emergency room of Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital ("Holy
Cross"), where she was examined and treated by Dr. Thomas
Nickol, an emergency room physician and general practitioner.
Thereafter, the Butterfields placed Tiffany exclusively in the
care and treatment of Dr. Monty McClellan, a family
practitioner. He examined Tiffany on five occasions in August
through mid-December, 1984.
Following his August 16, 1984 examination, Dr. Nickol
recommended close observation of Tiffany's breathing with
attention to possible cyanosis or blue discoloration. However,
neither Drs. Nickol or Okubo nor Holy Cross referred the
Butterfields to a physician with more extensive expertise
specifically in infant breathing disorders. They also did not
recommend the use of home apnea monitoring equipment. The
record does not indicate what, if any, care or treatment was
provided by Dr. McClellan for Tiffany's breathing problems
during the last four months of her life.
After Tiffany's death, the Butterfields sued Drs. Nickol
and Okubo and Holy Cross (but not Dr. McClellan) for medical
malpractice, filing their complaint on December 15, 1986. On
August 25, 1987, the district court held a scheduling
conference, after which an order issued stating that "All
discovery must be completed, including the filing of
depositions[,] by December 11, 1987." On December 11, 1987,
the Butterfields moved to extend the discovery deadline in
relation to Holy Cross, and on December 23, 1987, in relation
to Dr. Nickol. On December 10 and 11, 1987, the defendants
filed motions for summary judgment accompanied by affidavits
stating in essence that the defendants' treatment of Tiffany
had not fallen below the applicable standard of care and was
not the cause of her death. The court heard those motions on
December 23, 1987. The Butterfields had no expert testimony in
the record in their favor until the day before the summary
judgment hearing, when they filed an affidavit by Dr. H. Barry
Jacobs. They attempted service of the Jacobs affidavit on
opposing counsel that evening and/or the next day. The copy
intended for Dr. Nickol#s counsel was left with a security
guard employed at the office building at which counsel works,
and Dr. Okubo's counsel could not locate any served copy until
after the summary judgment hearing.

880347-CA
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The trial court noted the apparent defects in service of
the Jacobs affidavit, and seems to have concluded that, with or
without the Jacobs affidavit, the Butterfields had failed to
establish a prima facie case because no competent expert
testimony indicated either a breach of the standard of care or
that the defendants' medical treatment proximately caused the
child's death. The principal2 issues presented are therefore
(1) whether the Jacobs affidavit is entitled to consideration
in ruling on the motion/ and (2) whether there is sufficient
evidence in the record to create a factual issue about whether
the defendants both breached the standard of care applicable to
each and thereby proximately caused Tiffany's death.
Service of the Jacobs Affidavit
As courts have often noted, a party opposing a motion for
summary judgment that is supported by affidavits and/or other
evidentiary materials "may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
. . . otherwise . • . must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against him."3 in this case, therefore, the Butterfields had

2. The Butterfields also argue that the district court should
have granted their motion to extend the time limit for
completion of discovery. However, we find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court's scheduling of the case. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 16(b); 3 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice
11 16.22 at 16-123 (2d ed.1989). Moreover, since the case was
properly dismissed on summary judgment, additional time for
discovery would serve no purpose. The Butterfields were not
entitled to delay the summary judgment because they failed to
proceed under Utah R. Civ, P. 56(f), See Cox v. Winters, 678
P.2d 311, 314 (Utah 1984); Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical,
Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Downtown Athletic
Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 278-79 (Utah Ct. 1987).
3. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987); Franklin Fin, v. New
Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983).

880347-CA
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to introduce evidence supporting those elements4 of their
case that had been effectively challenged by the defendants in
moving for summary judgment. A major part of the Butterfields'
evidence was the Jacobs affidavitThe defendants argue that the Jacobs affidavit should not
be considered because it was not properly served on their
counsel. Axiomatically, an affidavit in opposition to a motion
for summary judgment must not merely be filed with the court;
it must also be served on opposing counsel no later than the
day before the hearing on the motion,5 to allow them an
opportunity to prepare for the hearing. We have previously
noted that an affidavit that has not been properly served
should not be considered, and the motion may be resolved
without it. P & B Land, Inc. v. Kluncrervik, 751 P.2d 274, 277
(Utah App. 1988).
In this case, however, the facts relating to the lack of
service were not suitably established. The Jacobs affidavit
was accompanied by a certificate attesting to proper service.
The only evidence to the contrary in the record is the unsworn
verbal representations of counsel about the defects in service,
representations based in part on hearsay conversations with
their office personnel. While we have no reason to question
the accuracy of counsel's representations, the Jacobs affidavit
was nevertheless the principal feature of the Butterfields1
opposition to the potentially dispositive motions for summary
judgment. The certificate of service is entitled to be taken
at face value, unless admissible evidence shows it to be
erroneous. The representations of counsel, though entirely
credible as far as they go, are nevertheless not evidence, and
therefore do not suffice to establish facts showing fatal
deficiencies in the service of the Jacobs affidavit. We
therefore consider the Jacobs affidavit in determining whether
the Butterfields came forward with sufficient evidence to
warrant denial of summary judgment.
4.
Briefly, to recover for medical malpractice, the plaintiff
must show that he or she suffered an injury that was actually
and proximately caused by an act or omission of the medical
professional that fell below the standard of care for that
professional's medical field or specialty. See Robinson v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987);
Hoopiiana v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 270 (Utah
App. 1987).
5.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

880347-CA
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Standard of Care
Due to the technical and complex nature of a medical
doctor's services, expert medical testimony must ordinarily6
be presented in order to establish the standard of care by
which the doctor's conduct is to be measured and that the
injury was proximately caused by conduct of the doctor that
fell below that standard of care. Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah
262, 139 P.2d 216, 220 (1943); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d
817, 821-22 (Utah App. 1988); Martin'v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337, 338
(Utah App. 1987); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.,
740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App. 1987). Further, the expert
testimony, like the standard of care which is its subject
matter, is specific to the particular medical specialty or area
of expertise of the defendant. In other words, one physician
is not qualified to give an admissible opinion on the treatment
provided by another physician, unless the physician giving the
opinion is shown to have familiarity with the treating
physician's particular area of practice.7
The expert affidavits submitted by the defendants in
moving for summary judgment indicate both that the attesting
expert was qualified to render an opinion on the standard of
care applicable to the particular defendant about which he was
speaking, and that the defendant's treatment of Tiffany did not
fall below that standard. The question thus becomes whether
Dr. Jacobs also indicated familiarity with the standards of

6.
An exception is made where the physician's error is so
plain and simple that it is within the range of ordinary lay
knowledge. For example, in Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah
1980), a surgeon left a surgical cutting needle inside the
plaintiff's body, and the court held that expert testimony on
the standard of care was not needed, in essence because
everybody knows that a surgeon should not leave inside a sharp,
foreign object used to make the incision. In this case,
however, whether the defendants should have taken additional
steps to prevent future apnea is a factual question not within
the range of ordinary lay knowledge.
7. Burton v. Younqblood, 711 P.2d 245, 247-48 (Utah 1985); see
also Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 822.

R80347-CA
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care applicable to the defendants sufficient to warrant
consideration of his opinion. In that regard, Dr. Jacobs
stated:
1. I am a physician licensed in the State
of Maryland and am a Board Certified Surgeon
since 1974. I have past experience in
Emergency Room care at four hospitals, and
Pediatrics, having cared for patients in
private practice and hospitals, including
the Children's Hospital in Washington, D.C.
3* I am familiar with the Standard of Care,
applicable in 1984, required in pediatrics
and emergency room medicine, as well as
hospital responsibility for adequate record
keeping and availability of previous records
during later follow up care for a related
complaint.
i
Based on those statements, there is reason to question whether
Dr. Jacobs' apparently rather eclectic background qualifies him
as an expert in all three of the defendants' fields of medical
practice. However, our role is not to cross-examine the
affidavit by conjecture;8 rather, we take it at face value,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Butterfields, since they lost the summary judgment motions in
the court below.9 In that light, Dr. Jacobs' representations
of his competence are not so patently unfounded or conclusory
that they can be wholly disregarded. Because Dr. Jacobs'
opinion concerning the standard of care contradicts those of
the defendants' experts, it demonstrates the existence of a
dispute of material fact, which precludes summary judgment on
the question of the standard of care.
Proximate Causation
However, while Dr. Jacobs' criticizes the defendants'
treatment of Tiffany, he does not establish the requisite
8. See Reevesf 764 p.2d at 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("In
considering a motion for summary judgment, it is not appropriate
for a court to weigh the evidence or assess credibility[.])H
9. Branham v. Provo School Dist., 780 P.2d 810 (Utah 1989);
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah
1989); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 299 (Utah
1987).

880347-CA
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causal link between that treatment and Tiffany's death. Dr.
Jacobs opines that the defendants' failure to prescribe home
monitoring of Tiffany's breathing, and perhaps also a more
generalized inattention to Tiffany's breathing problems,
constitute treatment falling below the standard of care,,
However, those asserted errors occurred in mid-1984, whereas
Tiffany died on December 19, 1984, four months after she had
been placed in the care of another medical practitioner. The
defendants argue that these facts, along with expert opinion,
indicate that their treatment of Tiffany did not proximately
cause her death. Dr. Jacobs, however, ignores the causation
question.
The element of proximate causation in a tort case inquires
into whether the defendant could, under the circumstances,
reasonably have foreseen that the harm of which the plaintiff
complains would result from the defendant's breach of the
standard of care. See Jackson v. Hicks, 738 P.2d 1037, 1039
(Utah 1987); Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., Inc., 697 P.2d 240,
245-47 (Utah 1985); Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 728-29
(Utah 1985). Without proof of proximate cause, the plaintiff
cannot recover in tort. Powell Div. of Dow Chemical U.S.A. v.
Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc., 761 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah
1988); Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078,
1082-83 (Utah 1985).
When proximate causation was called into question by the
defendants in moving for summary judgment, it was incumbent on
the Butterfields to come forward with evidence of a causal link
between the purported malpractice and the harm for which they
seek damagese 10 However, there is nothing in the Jacobs
affidavit to indicate that the defendants' medical treatment
proximately caused Tiffany's death, or even caused her death at
all. From the record, we cannot exclude the possibility that
the defendants may have erred, but fortuitously, their error
was not a cause, or a substantial enough cause, of Tiffany's
death. 1 1 The allegation of causation, a critical element of
the Butterfields' prima facie case, thus remains
unsubstantiated.

10.

Hunt v. Hurst, 125 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24 (1990).

11.

Cf. Reeves, 764 P.2d at 642 (Utah App. 1988).

880347-CA
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IN THE THIRD JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAXB COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians
and parents of and on
behalf of TIFFANY RUTH
BUTTERFIELD,

AFFIDAVIT OF H. BARRY
JACOBS, M-D,

Plaintiffs,
-vs-

Civil No.

DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICHOL,
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5,

C86-9250

Judge Richard Moffatt

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)

as,

H. Barry Jacobs# M*D*, being first duly sworn on oath
deposes and states:
1* I am a physician licensed in the State of Maryland
and am a Board Certified Surgeon since 1974. **3^h«w*p«st*
experience in Emergency Boom care at four hospit^a, &x*d
Pediatrics, having cared for patients" ia~priy*£ji pf£gt|ca $gd
hospitals, including the Children** Hniplt^\, jj^JfttthliB^£ITi P*c*
2. I have reviewed the emergency room and pediatric
records of the Decedent, Tiffiany R- Butterfield, as well as the
depositions of her Parents, Albert and Angela Butterfield* and
have met with Albert Butterfield*
3. I am familiar with the Standard of Care, applicable
in 1984, required in pediatrics and emergency room medicine, as
well as hospital responsibility for adequate record keeping and
availability of previous records during later follow up care for
a related complaint*
4. After a thorough review of the available data I am of
the opinion that care below an acceptable standard was provided
to Tiffany Buttarfield by Dr* Nichol, Dr. Okubo, and the Holy
Cross Jordan Valley Hospial with the specifics related below*

5. Assuming the facts as related in the parent's
depositions to be true, the history of present illness and/or
chief complaints gathered by the hospital nursing staff and Dr.
Nichols on 07/04/84 fail to detail the fact that actual apnea was
observed by the parents and there was cyanosis. Also omitted was
the fact that the child required stimulation such as pinching or
shaking before respiration was resumed. Given the lack of
significant findings on exam to account for respiratory
compromise and/or the apparent concern and anxiety of the
parents, such an omission contributed directly to the failure to
consider SIDS in a differential diagnosis.
6. When the child was taken as directed for pediatric
evaluation on 07/16/84 by Dr. Okubo a vague reference was made
concerning the fact that the child did have unexplained
respiratory problems. Once again, an inadequate history lead to
an incomplete assessment and second failure to consider the need
to rule out SIDS as an etiological possibility.
7. The second emergency room visit of 08/16/84 did
contain a somewhat unclear reference to periods of apnea not
associated with cyanosis. This is refuted by the parent1s
deposition in that the child had been observed to have cyanosis
with the apnea and once again required stimulation while being
transported to the hospital that did resolve the cynosis.
8. It is alleged that the prior emergency room record of
07/04/8 4 could not be obtained. Such data- should have been
available. This would have reinforced the fact that unexplained
respiratory problems existed and a differential diagnosis
including SIDS should have been developed.
9. The physical exam as recorded by Dr. Nichols on
08/16/84 failed to note any cardiac findings. The discharge
instructions did imply some need for monitoring the infant and
that the child should be re-evaluated by the Pediatrician. The
child's parrents insist they did not receive any follow-up
recommendations and therefore were unaware of the need for same.
10. There are no records available to detail what was
recorded during a third emergency room visit on or about
10/01/8 4. The parent's deposition indicates the child again had
an apneic episode and required stimulation. The deposition goes
on to insist that a concern about SIDS was raised and discounted
by Dr. Nichols as a possibility even though no other etiology had
surfaced to explain the child's problems or account for the
degree of parental concern and/or anxiety.
11. On 12/19/84 Tiffany Butterfield did indeed die from
SIDS. This would easily have been avoided to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty by either in-hospital observation and
monitoring for apnea followed by the issuance of a home apnea
monitor# or simply arranging for a home apnea monitor.

c
warrented foUowxng the 0 / o J / f l J ^ 8 " ^ t hV al ta l t8 U c hX affl
" « « • »<*
opinion that such" care was Vu(l\ f T T ^
'V l 6 / 8 4 o f t h e
check-up and/or the 08/16/84 fnd 1 0 / 0 1 A V * * °
P*""ric
Drs. Okubo and Nichols and a dutv li V
emergency
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H. Barry J a c o l t f / ^ . D .
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December,Subscribed
1987.
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Faye Araaim
Reston, VA
My Commission Expires:
My Commission Expires May 18, \m

